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Abstract
According to a standard view, quantum mechanics (QM) is a con-
textual theory and quantum probability does not satisfy Kolmogorov’s
axioms. We show, by considering the macroscopic contexts associated
with measurement procedures and the microscopic contexts (µ-contexts)
underlying them, that one can interpret quantum probability as epis-
temic, despite its non-Kolmogorovian structure. To attain this result we
introduce a predicate language L(x), a classical probability measure on it
and a family of classical probability measures on sets of µ-contexts, each
element of the family corresponding to a (macroscopic) measurement pro-
cedure. By using only Kolmogorovian probability measures we can thus
define mean conditional probabilities on the set of properties of any quan-
tum system that admit an epistemic interpretation but are not bound to
satisfy Kolmogorov’s axioms. The generalized probability measures asso-
ciated with states in QM can then be seen as special cases of these mean
probabilities, which explains how they can be non-classical and provides
them with an epistemic interpretation. Moreover, the distinction between
compatible and incompatible properties is explained in a natural way, and
purely theoretical classical conditional probabilities coexist with empiri-
cally testable quantum conditional probabilities.
Key words: quantum probability, contextuality, entanglement, quan-
tum measurements.
1 Introduction
There are some typical features of quantum mechanics (QM) that are well es-
tablished and accepted in the current literature but still raise interpretative
problems. We are especially interested here in the following topics.
(i) Non-kolmogorovian character of quantum probability, implied by the non-
distributivity of the lattice of (physical) properties, which is the basic structure
of standard quantum logic (QL).
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(ii) The doctrine that, whenever a physical system in a given state is con-
sidered, a quantum observable generally has not a prefixed value but only a
set of potential values, and that a measurement actualizes one of these values,
yielding an outcome that depends on the specific measurement procedure that
is adopted (contextuality).
There is a huge literature on these topics, which goes back to the early days
of QM. We limit ourselves here to recall that the QL issue was started by a
famous paper by Birkhoff and von Neumann (1935), while the contextuality at
a distance (or nonlocality) and, more generally, the contextuality of QM were
accepted by most physicists as ”mathematically proven” after the publication
of Bell’s (1964, 1966) and Kochen-Specker’s (1967) theorems, later supported
by numerous different proofs of the same or similar theorems (among which the
famous proof of nonlocality provided in 1990 by Greenberger, Horne, Shimony
and Zeilinger, which does not resort to inequalities).
Non-classical probability and contextuality can be linked, and inquiring their
links leads to important achievements. This issue has been already studied
by the ”Va¯xjo¨ school”, and in particular by Khrennikov (2009). We propose
in this paper a new perspective, according to which quantum probability and
its nonclassical features can be interpreted as derived notions in a classical
probabilistic framework by taking into account microscopic and macroscopic
contexts.
To the best of our knowledge, our proposal is innovative. Let us therefore
summarize the essentials of it.
First of all, we introduce some epistemological and physical remarks on QM
in Section 2 by referring to a conception of QM according to which QM deals
with individual examples of physical systems (briefly, individual objects) and
their properties (see, e.g., Busch et al., 1996). Bearing in mind these remarks, we
work out in Section 3 a predicate language L(x) whose predicates either denote
states or pairs made up of a property E and a (generally unknown) microscopic
context (µ-context) C. Hence the elementary sentences of L(x) assert that the
individual object x is in a given state or that x has a given property in a given
µ-context, but not that x has a given property without reference to contexts,
as in the standard language of QM. Then we introduce a classical notion of
probability on the set of all sentences of L(x) in Section 4 and a family of classical
probability measures on sets of µ-contexts in Section 5, each element of the
family corresponding to ameasurement procedure that determines amacroscopic
measurement context. We can thus define a notion of compatibility on the set
E of all properties, hence a notion of testability on the set of all sentences
of L(x), and use the foregoing probabilities conjointly to define the notion of
mean conditional probability on the subset of all testable sentences of L(x) and
the related notion of mean probability measurement. The former admits an
interpretation that is epistemic (in a broad sense, i.e., relating to our degree of
knowledge/lack of knowledge), even if it is not bound to satisfy Kolmogorov’s
axioms because it is obtained by averaging over classical probability measures.
Based on the definitions and results expounded above, we focus in Section 6
on the set E of all properties, on which mean conditional probabilities induce a
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preorder relation ≺. We show that, if suitable structural conditions are satisfied,
a family of mean conditional probabilities can be introduced, parametrized by
the set S of all states, each element of which is a generalized probability measure
on (E , ≺). Moreover these measures allow the definition of a new kind of condi-
tioning referring to a sequence of measurement procedures that is conceptually
different from classical conditioning.
The formal scheme described above characterizes a broad class T of theories.
Then we assume in Section 7 that QM belongs to T , so that states and properties
can be interpreted as quantum states and quantum properties, respectively, and
the quantum probability measures associated with states can be considered as
the specific form that the generalized probability measures defined on E take in
QM. Hence we attain the following results.
(i) The nonclassical character of quantum probability can be explained in
classical terms by taking into account µ-contexts. It follows in particular that
quantum probability can be given an epistemic rather than an ontic interpre-
tation in our approach.1
(ii) The quantum relation of compatibility on the set of properties can be
considered as the specific form that the relation of compatibility introduced in
the general framework takes in QM.
(iii) The conditional probability usually introduced in QM can be considered
as the specific form that the new kind of conditioning introduced in the general
framework takes in QM.
We conclude our treatment by observing in Section 8 that the general no-
tions of mean conditional probability and mean probability measurement are
conceptually close to the notions of universal average and universal measure-
ment, respectively, introduced by Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi (2014, 2017).
Hence our approach provides a description of measurements of probabilities
that is similar to the proposal of these authors, which they maintain to supply
a possible solution of the hoary quantum measurement problem. We however
do not make such a claim in the case of our approach, because we supply our
definition of mean probability measurement resting on the standard notion of
measurement in QM, without entering the problematic aspects of this notion
(as state reduction and nonlocality) which arise when QM is assumed to refer
to individual objects and their properties. Nevertheless the results expounded
above are sufficient in our opinion to justify our proposal.
To close this section, let us point out an essential difference between our
approach and Khrennikov’s. This author considers contexts ‘as a generalization
of a widely used notion of preparation procedure’ (2009b). As we have seen, we
introduce instead measurement procedures determining macroscopic measure-
ment contexts, each of which is associated with a set of microscopic contexts.
The latter play an essential role in our framework, as they allow us to obtain
the results resumed above, and do not occur in Khrennikov’s approach.
1We stress that our general framework does not constitutes a hidden variables theory
for QM in a standard sense. Indeed, µ-contexts are associated (generally many-to-one) with
measurement procedures, not with properties or states of the measured entity. Our perspective
complies instead with Aerts’ (1986) hidden measurements approach.
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2 Some remarks on QM
As other advanced scientific theories, QM is expressed by means of a fragment
of the natural language enriched with technical terms (the language of QM ) and
is characterized by a pair (F, I), with F a logical and mathematical formalism
and I an empirical interpretation which establishes connections between F and
an empirical domain. This interpretation generally is indirect, in the sense that
there are theoretical entities that are connected with the empirical domain only
via derived theoretical entities, and incomplete, in the sense that only limited
ranges of values of the theoretical entities are actually interpreted.2
To attain the results summarized in Section 1, we need to formalize an el-
ementary sublanguage of the language of QM. Let us therefore preliminarily
discuss some features of this language and some intuitive ideas on its inter-
pretation, referring to a conception of QM according to which QM deals with
individual objects and their properties, as we have anticipated in Section 1. For
the sake of simplicity we avoid distinguishing everywhere in the following the
theoretical entities from the empirical entities that correspond to them via I.
First of all we recall that in most presentations of QM the notions of physical
system, or entity, (physical) property and (physical) state are considered as
basic. Moreover, according to some known approaches to the foundations of QM
(see, e.g., Beltrametti and Cassinelli, 1981; Ludwig, 1983) states are considered
as classes of probabilistically equivalent preparation procedures, or preparing
devices, and properties as classes of probabilistically equivalent dichotomic (yes-
no) registering devices.
A preparation procedure pi in the class S, when activated, produces an in-
dividual object x (which can be identified with the act of activation itself if one
wants to avoid ontological commitments). Hence, after the act of activation, a
sentence that states that x is in the state S is true and a sentence that states
that x is in a state T 6= S is false.
Given an individual object x in the state S, however, activating a registering
device r in the class E does not test whether the property E is possessed or
not by x independently of the simultaneous activation of other devices. Indeed
it follows from some known proofs of the Bell and Kochen-Specker theorems
mentioned in Section 1 (see, e.g., Greenberger et al., 1990; Mermin 1993) that,
if the laws of QM have to be preserved in every conceivable physical situation,
2More generally, according to the standard epistemological conception, or received view
(see, e.g., Braithwaite, 1953; Hempel, 1965; Carnap, 1966), a fully-developed physical theory
T , as QM, is expressed by means of a metalanguage in which a theoretical language LT , an
observational language LO and correspondence rules RC connecting LT and LO can be distin-
guished. The theoretical apparatus of T , expressed by means of LT , includes a mathematical
structure and, usually, an intended interpretation that is a direct and complete physical model
of the mathematical structure. The observational language LO describes instead an empirical
domain, hence it has a semantic interpretation, so that the correspondence rules RC provide
an empirical interpretation of the mathematical structure that is indirect and incomplete in
the sense specified above.
The received view has been criticized by several authors (see, e.g. Kuhn, 1962; Feyerabend,
1975) and is nowadays maintained to be outdated by some scholars. However, we retain here
some of its basic ideas that we consider epistemologically relevant.
4
the outcome that is obtained depends on the set of the registering devices that
are activated together with r, i.e., on the macroscopic context CM determined
by the whole quantum measurement M that is performed (of course, these
registering devices must be compatible, i.e., they must belong to different but
compatible properties). Hence, one must admit that, generally, a truth value
can be assigned to a sentence which states that x possesses the property E only
if also a macroscopic context is specified (contextuality of QM).3
We observe now that, generally, the macroscopic context CM determined
by M may be produced by many different microscopic physical situations that
cannot be distinguished at a macroscopic level (though they can be described,
in principle, by QM itself). Hence we can associate CM with a set CM of
microscopic contexts (µ-contexts ; of course, CM could reduce to a singleton in
special cases). It is then natural to think that the truth value of a sentence
asserting that x possesses the property E generally depends on the µ-context
that is realized whenM is performed. But we cannot know this µ-context, hence
only a probability of it, which expresses our degree of ignorance, can be given
(we naively argue here as though the set CM were discrete, to avoid technical
complications).
Summing up, our analysis leads us to conclude that a truth value can be
assumed to exist consistently with QM only in the case of a sentence asserting
that an individual object x possesses a property E in a given µ-context C,
not in the case of a sentence simply asserting that x possesses a property E.
Moreover, in general this value cannot be deduced from the laws of QM, which
are probabilistic laws that make no explicit reference to contexts.
The conclusions above have an important consequence. Every quantum pre-
diction concerns probabilities, hence testing it requires evaluating frequencies
of outcomes. In our present perspective, a typical test of this kind consists in
preparing a broad set of individual objects in a given state S and then per-
forming on each of them the same quantum measurement M , which requires
activating one or more (compatible) registering devices simultaneously. The
macroscopic context CM then is the same for every individual object, but the
µ-context C ∈ CM generally changes in an unpredictable way. Thus we meet
3We have emphasized in some previous papers (see, e.g., Garola, 1999; Garola and Pykacz,
2004; Garola and Sozzo, 2010; Garola and Persano, 2014) that the epistemological clause
”the laws of QM have to be preserved in every conceivable physical situation” is essential
in the proofs of Bell’s and Kochen-Specker’s theorems. Nevertheless, this clause generally
is not explicitly noticed or stated, possibly because it seems to be unquestionably justified
by the outstanding success of QM. Yet it must be observed that all the proofs mentioned
above proceed ab absurdo, hypothesizing physical situations in which noncompatible physical
properties are assumed to be simultaneously possessed by an individual object. In such
situations the quantum laws that are applied cannot be simultaneously tested, hence the
assumption that they hold anyway seems more consistent with a classical than with a quantum
view. One can therefore try to give up the aforesaid clause, but then the proofs of Bell’s
an Kochen-Specker’s theorems cannot be completed. This conclusion opens the way to the
attempt at recovering noncontextual interpretations of QM (Garola, Sozzo and Wu, 2016).
The arguments in this paper, however, apply to every theory in which contexts can be defined,
irrespective of whether the results of measurements are context-depending (locally, or also at
a distance) or not.
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two distinct sources of randomness. The first is the state S (be it a pure state
or a mixture) that may not determine univocally the properties of an individual
object in QM, even if the µ-context C is given. The second is the unpredictable
change of the µ-context that occurs when performing M on different individual
objects. We are therefore led to think that quantum probability takes implicitly
into account both sources. We will see in the following sections that this idea
can explain the non-kolmogorovian character of quantum probability, together
with the rather surprising fact that the values of quantum probability neither
depend on µ-contexts nor on macroscopic contexts (see, e.g., Mermin, 1993).
3 The formal language L(x)
As we have anticipated in Section 1, we intend to introduce in the present
paper a general probabilistic framework that may characterize a class of theories
including QM. Of course, this will be done by bearing in mind all the suggestions
following from our remarks on QM in Section 2.
As a first step we construct in this section a formal language L(x) (which
formalizes, in the case of QM, an elementary sublanguage of the language of
QM, and can be considered a part of the formalism F ). To this end we agree
to use standard symbols in set theory and logic. In particular, c, ∩, ∪, ⊂, \, ∅
and P(Ψ) will denote complementation, intersection, union, inclusion, difference,
empty set and power set of the set Ψ, respectively. Moreover, N will denote the
set of natural numbers.
Definition 3.1. Let E, S and C be disjoint sets whose elements we call prop-
erties, states and µ-contexts, respectively, and let us set
EC = {EC = (E,C) | E ∈ E , C ∈ C}.
Then, we denote by L(x) a classical predicate logic, constructed as follows.
Syntax.
(i) An individual variable x.
(ii) A set Π = EC ∪ S of monadic predicates.
(iii) Connectives ¬ (not), ∧ (and), ∨ (or).
(iv) Parentheses (,).
(v) A set Ψ(x) of well formed formulas (wffs), obtained by applying re-
cursively standard formation rules in classical logic (to be precise, for every
A ∈ Π, A(x) ∈ Ψ(x); for every α(x) ∈ Ψ(x), ¬α(x) ∈ Ψ(x); for every
α(x), β(x) ∈ Ψ(x), α(x) ∧ β(x) ∈ Ψ(x) and α(x) ∨ β(x) ∈ Ψ(x))
Semantics.
(i) A universe U , whose elements we call individual objects.
(ii) An injective mapping
ext : A ∈ Π −→ ext(A) ∈ P(U).
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(iii) The boolean sublattice Θ =< ext(Π) >= (ext(Π),c ,∩,∪) of P(U) gen-
erated by ext(Π).
(iv) The surjective mapping (still called ext by abuse of language)
ext : α(x) ∈ Ψ(x) −→ ext(α(x)) ∈ Θ
recursively defined by the following rules:
for every A ∈ Π, ext(A(x)) = ext(A);
for every α(x) ∈ Ψ(x), ext(¬α(x)) = U \ ext(α(x)) = (ext(α(x)))c;
for every α(x), β(x) ∈ Ψ(x), ext(α(x) ∧ β(x)) = ext(α(x)) ∩ ext(β(x)) and
ext(α(x) ∨ β(x)) = ext(α(x)) ∪ ext(β(x)).
(v) A set Σ of interpretations of the variable x such that, for every σ ∈ Σ,
σ : x ∈ {x} −→ σ(x) ∈ U .
(vi) For every σ ∈ Σ, a truth assignment
νσ : α(x) ∈ Ψ(x) −→ νσ(α(x)) ∈ {t, f}
(where t stands for true and f for false), such that νσ(α(x)) = t iff σ(x) ∈
ext(α(x)) (hence νσ(α(x)) = f iff σ(x) ∈ (ext(α(x)))c).
The logical preorder and the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of L(x) can then
be introduced in a standard way, as follows.
Definition 3.2. We denote by < and ≡ the (reflexive and transitive) relation
of logical preorder and the relation of logical equivalence on Ψ(x), respectively,
defined by standard rules in classical logic (to be precise, for every α(x), β(x) ∈
Ψ(x), α(x) < β(x) iff, for every σ ∈ Σ, νσ(β(x)) = t whenever νσ(α(x)) =
t, and α(x) ≡ β(x) iff α(x) < β(x) and β(x) < α(x)). Moreover we put
Ψ′(x) = Ψ(x)/ ≡ and denote by <′ the partial order canonically induced by <
on Ψ′(x). Then (Ψ′(x), <′) is a boolean lattice (the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra
of L(x)) whose operations ¬′, ∧′,∨′ are canonically induced on Ψ′(x) by ¬, ∧,
∨, respectively).
As stated in Definition 3.1, the language L(x) is a classical predicate logic.
It has, however, some innovative features from the point of view of the interpre-
tation I. Indeed the words ”states”, ”properties”, ”µ-contexts” and ”individual
objects” occur in Definition 3.1 just as nouns of elements of sets, but obviously
refer to an interpretation that makes these elements correspond to empirical
notions denoted by the same nouns. Then, each state S is classified in L(x) as
a predicate, and an elementary wff of the form S(x) (interpreted as ”the indi-
vidual object x is in the state S”) is argument of truth assignments, at variance
with widespread views that consider states as possible worlds of a Kripkean se-
mantics in QL (see, e.g., Dalla Chiara et al., 2004). Furthermore properties are
not classified as predicates of L(x). Rather, a predicate either is a state or it is
a pair EC = (E,C) (an elementary wff of the form EC(x) is then interpreted as
”the individual object x has the property E in the context C”).
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4 A contextual probability structure on L(x)
We state now an assumption that is suggested by our introduction of new entities
(µ-contexts) which do not occur explicitly in the formal apparatus of QM.
Axiom P. A mapping ξ : ext(α(x)) ∈ Θ −→ ξ(ext(α(x))) ∈ [0, 1] exists such
that Φ = (U,Θ, ξ) is a classical probability space.4
Based on Axiom P we can introduce now a probability measure on L(x) by
means of the following definition.
Definition 4.1. Let Ψ+(x) ⊂ Ψ(x) be the set of wffs of L(x) such that, for
every β(x) ∈ Ψ+(x), ξ(ext(β(x)) 6= 0, and let p be a binary mapping such that
p : (α(x), β(x)) ∈ Ψ(x)×Ψ+(x) −→ p(α(x) | β(x)) = ξ(ext(α(x))∩ext(β(x)))
ξ(ext(β(x))) ∈
[0, 1].
We say that the pair (Φ, p) is a µ-contextual probability structure on L(x) and
that p(α(x) | β(x)) is the µ-contextual conditional probability of α(x) given
β(x). Moreover, whenever ext(β(x)) = U we say that p(α(x) | β(x)) is the
µ-contextual absolute probability of α(x) and simply write p(α(x)) in place of
p(α(x) | β(x)).
The terminology introduced in Definition 4.1 (where the word µ-contextual
underlines the dependence of probabilities on µ-contexts through the wffs of
L(x)), is justified by the following statement.
Proposition 4.1. Let β(x) ∈ Ψ+(x). Then, the mapping
pβ(x) : α(x) ∈ Ψ(x) −→ p(α(x) | β(x)) ∈ [0, 1]
satisfies the following conditions.
(i) Let α(x) ∈ Ψ(x) be such that ext(α(x)) = U (equivalently, α(x) ≡
α(x) ∨ ¬α(x)). Then, pβ(x)(α(x)) = 1.
(ii) Let α1(x), α2(x) ∈ Ψ(x) be such that ext(α1(x)) ∩ ext(α2(x)) = ∅
(equivalently, α1(x) < ¬α2(x)). Then, pβ(x)(α1(x) ∨ α2(x)) = pβ(x)(α1(x)) +
pβ(x)(α2(x)).
Proof. Straightforward.
Proposition 4.1 shows indeed that, for every β(x) ∈ Ψ+(x), pβ(x) is a prob-
ability measure on (Ψ(x),¬,∧,∨).
Examples. Let E,F ∈ E , S, T ∈ S, C,D ∈ C, and let FD(x), S(x) ∈ Ψ+(x).
Then, we obtain from Definition 4.1:
(i) p(EC(x) | FD(x)) =
ξ(ext(EC(x))∩ext(FD(x)))
ξ(ext(FD(x)))
;
4Following a standard terminology we call classical probability space here any triple
(Ω,Σ, µ), where Ω is a set, Σ is a Boolean σ-subalgebra of P(Ω), and µ : ∆ ∈ Σ −→ µ(∆) ∈
[0, 1] is a mapping satisfying the following conditions: (i) µ(Ω) = 1; (ii) if {∆i}i∈N is a family
of pairwise disjoint elements of Σ, then µ(∪i∆i) = Σiµ(∆i).
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(ii) p(EC(x) | S(x)) =
ξ(ext(EC(x))∩ext(S(x)))
ξ(ext(S(x))) ;
(iii) p(T (x) | S(x)) = ξ(ext(T (x))∩ext(S(x)))
ξ(ext(S(x))) .
Example (iii) is especially interesting because it shows that the µ-contextual
conditional probabilities do not always depend on µ-contexts.
By using Axiom P we have thus introduced µ-contextual conditional and ab-
solute probabilities on L(x). We stress that the µ-contextual probability struc-
ture introduced in Definition 4.1 is basically classical, hence these probabilities
admit an epistemic interpretation. In other words, they can be considered as
indexes of our lack of knowledge of the truth assignments on L(x).
5 Measurements and mean probabilities
Based on the notions introduced in Sections 3 and 4, we intend to supply in
this section a theoretical description of measurements testing probabilities. To
this end, let us observe that our remarks in Section 2 suggest that a test of the
probability of a wff α(x) ∈ Ψ(x) consists in choosing a measurement that checks
all the properties that occur in α(x) (hence these properties must be compatible)
on an individual object, performing it on a large number of individual objects,
and then evaluating the frequencies of the outcomes that have been obtained.
Moreover, the theoretical description of this test must refer to a probability
measure defined on some set of µ-contexts, to take into account our limited
knowledge of the µ-context that must be associated with each implementation of
the measurement on an individual object. Bearing in mind these requirements,
we introduce the following assumption.
Axiom M. Every E ∈ E is associated with a set ME of measurement proce-
dures,5 and every M ∈ ME determines a macroscopic measurement context
CM associated with a classical probability space (CM ,ΣM , νM ), where CM is a
set of µ-contexts and, for every C ∈ CM , {C} belongs to ΣM .
We have seen in Section 2 that a quantum measurement may require that
more than one property be simultaneously tested. We are thus naturally led to
introduce the notions of compatibility, testability and conjoint testability in our
present framework, as follows.
Definition 5.1. Let {E,F, ...} be a countable set of properties of L(x). We
say that E,F, ... are compatible iff ME ∩MF ∩ ... 6= ∅, and denote by k the
compatibility relation on E defined by setting
for every E,F ∈ E, EkF iff E and F are compatible.
5We denote here abstract measurement procedures with the same symbols that we have
used in Section 2 to denote quantum measurements. We shall see in Section 7 that the latter
can be considered as the specific form that the former take in QM.
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Moreover, let α(x) ∈ Ψ(x) and let E,F, ... be the properties that occur in
the formal expression of α(x) (with indexes in C). Then we say that α(x) is
testable iff the following conditions hold.
(i) E,F, ... are compatible.
(ii) E,F, ... occur in the formal expression of α(x) with the same index C
and a macroscopic measurement procedure M ∈ME ∩MF ∩ ... exists such that
C ∈ CM .
Finally, let {α(x), β(x), ...} be a countable set of wffs of Ψ(x), We say that
α(x), β(x), ... are jointly testable iff the wff α(x) ∧ β(x) ∧ ... is testable. Then
we denote by ΨT (x) the set of all testable propositions of Ψ(x) and, for every
α(x) ∈ ΨT (x), we write αCM (x) in place of α(x) whenever explicit reference to
the measurement procedure M and to the µ-context C defined in (ii) must be
done.
We can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. (i) The binary relation k on E introduced in Definition 5.1
is reflexive and symmetric, but, generally, not transitive.
(ii) Let E ∈ E, M ∈ME and C ∈ CM . Then, EC(x) ∈ ΨT (x).
(iii) Let M be a measurement procedure, C,C′ ∈ M and C′ 6= C. More-
over, for every αCM (x) ∈ Ψ
T (x), let αC
′
M (x) be the wff obtained from α
C
M (x) by
replacing C with C′. Then, αC
′
M (x) ∈ Ψ
T (x).
Proof. Straightforward.
Of course, in every theory of the class that we are considering, each mea-
surement procedure M provides a theoretical description, via an empirical in-
terpretation I (see Section 2) of a concrete measurement. Then, it remains to
understand what one actually tests when evaluating the frequencies of outcomes
obtained as explained above. It is apparent indeed that such a test does not
refer to the µ-contextual conditional probabilities introduced in Definition 4.1,
because we cannot know nor fix the µ-context associated with each implementa-
tion of the measurement (hence µ-contextual probabilities must be classified as
theoretical entities that can be interpreted only indirectly, see Section 2). But
the unpredictable change of µ-context that generally occurs when performing
the measurement on different individual objects suggests that one actually tests
a mean of contextual µ-conditional probabilities over the family
{
αCM (x)
}
C∈CM
.
The following definition and assumption formalize this idea.
Definition 5.2. Let α(x), β(x) ∈ ΨT (x) be jointly testable and let E,F, ... ∈ E
be the properties that occur in one or both the formal expressions of α(x) and
β(x). Furthermore, let β(x) ∈ Ψ+(x). For every M ∈ ME ∩MF ∩ ... we put
< p(αCM (x) | β
C
M (x)) >CM=
∑
C∈CM
νM ({C})p(αCM (x) | β
C
M (x)).
Moreover, whenever the following equality holds for every M,N ∈ ME ∩
MF ∩ ...
< p(αCM (x) | β
C
M (x)) >CM=< p(α
C
N (x) | β
C
N (x)) >CN ,
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we omit the symbols M , N , C, D, CM and CN , and say that < p(α(x) | β(x)) >
is the mean conditional probability of α(x) given β(x).
Based on Definition 5.2 we maintain in the following that performing the
measurement corresponding (via I) to a measurement procedure M ∈ ME ∩
MF ∩ ... on a large number of individual objects provides a test of < p(α(x) |
β(x)) >, or, briefly, a mean probability measurement.
Axiom C.Mean conditional probability (hence mean probability measurements)
do exist for every pair (α(x), β(x)) of jointly testable wffs such that β(x) ∈
Ψ+(x).
It follows from Definition 5.2 and Axiom C that mean conditional prob-
abilities take into account two different kinds of ignorance. First, the lack of
knowledge about the truth assignments on L(x) mentioned at the end of Section
4. Second, the ignorance of the µ-context to be associated with a measurement
when this measurement is performed. Hence mean conditional probabilities
admit an epistemic interpretation even if they are not bound to satisfy Kol-
mogorov’s axioms, for they are average quantities.
To close this section, let us observe that our present perspective is supported
by some previous research in the literature. Indeed, as we have anticipated in
Section 1, mean conditional probabilities and mean probability measurements
are conceptually similar to the universal averages and the universal measure-
ments, respectively, introduced by Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi (2014, 2017).
Moreover, the recognition that two kinds of lack of knowledge occur when a
measurement is performed fits in well with similar remarks of these authors.6
6 Q-probability
The set E of all properties has a relevant role in QM, hence we focus on it in
the present section.
By using the notion of mean conditional probability introduced in Section
5, we firstly define an order structure on E , as follows.
Definition 6.1. Let E ∈ E, M ∈ ME, C ∈ CM , S ∈ S, let S(x) ∈ Ψ+(x), and
let
PS : E ∈ E −→ PS(E) ∈ [0, 1]
be the mapping defined by setting
6We recall that the Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi proposal finds its roots in the hidden
measurement approach (see, e.g., Aerts, 1986). This approach led the author to introduce
state property systems (see, e.g., Aerts, 1999), that successively evolved in the state-context-
property (SCoP) formalism (see, e.g., Aerts and Gabora, 2005; this formalism was mainly used
for working out a theory of concepts, in particular in the field of quantum cognition). It is then
possible to show that the SCoP formalism can be (partially) translated into the formalism
developed in the present paper, and conversely, which explains the conceptual similarities
pointed out above. For the sake of brevity we do not deal with this issue in detail here.
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PS(E) =< p(EC(x) | S(x)) >=
∑
C∈CM
νM ({C})p(EC(x) | S(x)) =
∑
C∈CM
νM ({C})
ξ(Ext(EC(x))∩Ext(S(x)))
ξ(Ext(S(x))) .
Then, we denote by ≺ and ≈ the preorder and the equivalence relation on
E, respectively, defined by setting, for every E,F ∈ E,
E ≺ F iff, for every S ∈ S, PS(E) ≤ PS(F )
and
E ≈ F iff E ≺ F and F ≺ E
It is now important to consider a special case that allows us to connect our
present framwork with QM. We therefore introduce the following definition.
Definition 6.2. Let ≺ be a partial order on E and let (E ,≺) be an orthocom-
plemented lattice. We denote meet, join, orthocomplementation, least element
and greatest element of (E ,≺) by ⋓, ⋒, ⊥, O and U, respectively. Moreover,
we denote by ⊥ the (binary) orthogonality relation canonically induced by ⊥ on
(E ,⋓,⋒,⊥)7. Then, for every S ∈ S, we say that PS is a generalized probability
measure on (E ,⋓, ⋒ ,⊥) iff it satisfies the following conditions.
(i) PS(U) = 1.
(ii) If {E1, E2, ...} is a countable set of properties of E and E1, E2, ... are
pairwise disjoint (i.e., for every k, l, Ek⊥El), then
PS(⋒kEk) =
∑
k PS(Ek).
Whenever PS is a generalized probability measure on (E ,⋓, ⋒ ,⊥), for every
E ∈ E we say that PS(E) is the Q-probability of E given S.
Definition 6.2 implies that a generalized probability measure PS does not
satisfy Kolmogorov’s axioms if (E ,⋓,⋒ ,⊥) is not a boolean lattice. Nevertheless
the Q-probability PS(E) of a property E ∈ E given S admits an epistemic
interpretation and can be empirically checked, as it is a special case of the mean
conditional probability introduced in Definition 5.2. It is then natural to wonder
whether a conditional Q-probability of a property E ∈ E given another property
F ∈ E can be defined by means of PS , generalizing standard procedures in
classical propositional logic. But if one tries to put
PS(E | F ) =
PS(E⋓F )
PS(F )
,
then the mapping
PSF : E ∈ E −→ PS(E | F ) ∈ [0, 1]
7We recall that ⊥ is a unary operation on (E,≺) such that, for every E,F ∈ E, E⊥⊥ = E,
E ≺ F implies F⊥ ≺ E⊥, E ⋓ E⊥ = O and E ⋒ E⊥ = I. Then ⊥ is the non-reflexive and
symmetric binary relation on E defined by setting, for every E,F ∈ E, E⊥F iff E ≺ F⊥.
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is not a generalized probability measure on (E ,⋓, ⋒ ,⊥) whenever this lattice is
not boolean. Indeed, consider a property E = E1 ⋒ E2, with E1, E2 ∈ E and
E1⊥E2. Then, we obtain
PSF (E) = PSF (E1 ⋒ E2) = PS(E1 ⋒ E2 | F ) =
PS((E1⋒E2)⋓F )
PS(F )
,
which is generally different from
PS((E1⋓F )⋒(E2⋓F ))
PS(F )
= PS(E1 | F ) + PS(E2 | F ) = PSF (E1) + PSF (E2)
whenever (E ,⋓, ⋒ ,⊥) is not distributive.
To overcome this difficulty one can intuitively refer to a sequence of two
measurements and introduce a non-standard kind of conditional probability, as
follows.
Definition 6.3. Let E ∈ E and let us put SE = {S ∈ S | PS(E) 6= 0}. We say
that a measurement procedure M ∈ME is of first kind iff it is associated with
a mapping
tE : S ∈ SE −→ tE(S) ∈ SE
such that PtE(S)(E) = 1. For every F ∈ E we then put
PS(F‖E) = PtE(S)(F ).
Moreover, let (E ,≺) be an orhocomplemented lattice and let PS and PtE(S)
be generalized probability measures on (E ,≺). Then we say that PS(E‖F ) is the
conditional Q-probability of E given F and S.
If a measurement corresponding (via I) to a first kind measurement pro-
cedure M ∈ ME exists and the conditions at the end of Definition 6.3 are
fulfilled, then PS(E‖F ) can be tested whenever S ∈ SF , as Axiom C implies
that PtE(S)(E) can always be tested (but no analogous of the Bayes theorem
can be stated for conditional Q-probabilities). Definition 6.3 thus introduces a
non-standard conditional probability on (E ,≺) that coexists with the (classical)
µ-conditional probability introduced in Definition 4.1 (which instead cannot be
tested directly and has the status of a purely theoretical notion, as we have seen
in Section 6).
7 Back to QM
Axiom P in Section 4 and axioms M and C in Section 5 characterize a broad
class T of theories, even if they have been introduced mainly by bearing in mind
QM. They do not occur in the standard formulation of QM, but if we assume
that they underlie QM, so that QM belongs to T , we can explain some relevant
aspects of QM in terms of the general notions characterizing T and obtain a
new perspective on quantum probability.
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To attain these results let us firstly recall that in Hibert space QM the
following mathematical representation is adopted.
Entity (physical system) =⇒ Hilbert space H.
State S ∈ S =⇒ Density operator ρS on H.
Property E ∈ E =⇒ Orthogonal projection operator PE on H.
Furthermore, the set of all orthogonal projection operators on H is an or-
thomodular lattice in which the partial order is defined independently of any
probability measure. Hence, the representation above induces on E an order,
that we denote by ≪, and (E ,≪) is an orthomodular lattice.
Secondly, let us recall that the Born rule associates a probability value
Tr [ρSPE ] (that does not depend on any context) with the pair (E, S). Hence
a quantum probability
QS : E ∈ E −→ Tr [ρSPE ] ∈ [0, 1]
is defined which is said to be a generalized probability measure on (E , ≪) (see,
e.g., Beltrametti and Cassinelli, 1981). Moreover, the family {QS}S∈S is order-
ing on (E ,≪) (ibid.), which means that the order induced by it on E coincides
with ≪. Therefore the lattice structure of (E , ≪) can be seen as induced by
{QS}S∈S .
Based on the above remarks, and assuming that QM belongs to T , the order
≪ and the quantum probability QS can be considered as the specific forms that
the order ≺ and the mapping PS (see Definition 6.1), respectively, take in QM.
We thus obtain
PS(E) = P (E | S) = QS(E) = Tr [ρSPE ].
If the quantum probability QS replaces PS in the conditions (i) and (ii)
stated in Definition 6.2, then these conditions are satisfied, which makes the
above classification of QS as a generalized probability measure consistent with
Definition 6.2.
The above interpretation of quantum probability leads to consider it as a
mean conditional probability (see Definition 5.2). This explains its non-classical
character and shows that it can be considered epistemic, at variance with its
standard ontic interpretation (see Section 5). Our main goal in this paper has
thus been achieved.
Let us denote now by κ the compatibility relation introduced in QM on
the set of all properties by setting, for every pair (E,F ) of properties, EκF
iff [PE , PF ] = 0. This relation is reflexive and symmetric but not transitive.
Hence it can be considered as the specific form that the relation k introduced
in Definition 5.1 takes in QM.
Coming to quantum measurements, let us remind that first kind quantum
measurements exist in QM (see e.g., Piron, 1976; Beltrametti and Cassinelli,
1981), and that the Lu¨ders rule states that, whenever a first kind (ideal) quan-
tum measurement of a property E is performed on an individual object x in the
state S and the yes outcome is obtained, then the state of the object after the
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measurement is described by the density operator PEρSPE
Tr[ρSPE ]
. Let us therefore
denote by D (H) the set of all density operators on H. Then the mapping
τE : ρS ∈ D (H) −→ τE(ρS) =
PEρSPE
Tr[ρ
S
PE ]
∈ D (H)
can be considered as the specific form that the mapping tE introduced in Defi-
nition 6.3 takes in QM.
Finally, we recall that the conditional probability QS(E | F ), in a state S,
of a property E given a property F , is defined in QM by referring to a quantum
measurement of E after a quantum measurement of F on an individual object
in the state S, and it is given by Tr[PEPF ρSPFPE ]
Tr[PEρSPE ]
. Hence this quantity can be
considered as the specific form that the conditional Q-probability of E given F
and S introduced in Definition 6.3 takes in QM. We thus obtain
PS(E‖F ) = QS(E | F ) =
Tr[PEPF ρSPFPE ]
Tr[PEρSPE ]
.
8 Closing remarks
As we have observed in Sections 1 and 5, our mean conditional probabilities
and mean probability measurements are conceptually similar to the universal
averages and universal measurements, respectively, introduced by Aerts and
Sassoli de Bianchi (2014, 2017). In particular, our recognition that mean con-
ditional probability summarizes two kinds of lack of knowledge fits in well with
the perspective of these authors. However, Aerts and Sassoli de Bianchi uphold
that their proposal leads to a possible solution of the quantum measurement
problem. Our approach, instead, has been conceived to show that nonclassical
(yet epistemic) probabilities may occur as a consequence of contextuality in a
broad class of theories. By assuming that QM belongs to this class we obtain an
explanation of some typical features of QM in terms of more primitive notions.
In particular, the compatibility relation on the set of all physical properties and
the quantum notion of conditional probability can be seen as special cases of
general notions that can be introduced whenever the links between contextual-
ity and nonclassical probability are recognized. More important, we obtain an
epistemic interpretation of quantum probability, notwithstanding its nonclassi-
cal structure, that opposes its standard ontic interpretation. We cannot provide
instead an explanation of the reduction of the state vector carried out by a quan-
tum measurement in our framework, or avoid the ”paradox” of nonlocality of
QM (see Section 1 and footnote 3).
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